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Executive Summary 
 
This report is part of the Wales Governance Centre’s Justice and Jurisdiction project. It raises the 
question of what Wales could and should try to do differently were criminal justice powers to be 
devolved to Wales, and seeks to provide at least a partial answer to that question by focusing on 
the issue of imprisonment. Given that Wales has the highest imprisonment rate in Western Europe, 
were different constitutional arrangements ever to be introduced, it is likely that the key priority 
for Welsh criminal justice policy would be to safely reduce prisoner numbers. Not least because of 
the opportunity that this would provide for diverting scarce resources to other priorities. 
By means of a number of case studies, the report draws attention to the experiences of other 
jurisdictions that have introduced measures to reduce high levels of imprisonment. In doing so it 
seeks to demonstrate not only that change is possible, but that a sustainable long-term alternative 
to a high imprisonment society is a realistic (if challenging) goal for public policy in Wales. It seeks 
to draw together a number of common themes from these case studies as well as making nine 
recommendations. 
Chapter One recaps the current situation with regards Wales’ imprisonment rate pointing out that 
not only is it the highest in Western Europe, but that there is little to suggest that this rate will 
reduce in future unless determined action is taken. It also recaps the case for alternative 
approaches whilst also noting the methodology adopted in the production of the case studies. 
In the introduction to Chapter Two we explain our choice of case studies, namely three US states – 
California, New York and Texas – and three western European countries – Portugal, Finland, and 
the Netherlands. Each case study goes on to provide an overview of developments in the 
jurisdiction that is its focus, drawing out key trends or initiatives relevant to changes in its 
imprisonment rate.  
 
California 
Having been at the centre of the US ‘prison boom’ from the 1980s onwards, in recent years 
California is one of a handful of states that has significantly reduced its reliance on custodial 
imprisonment. Although the numbers held in state prison and county jail remain very high by 
European standards, the very notable reductions made in California since 2010 offer a potential 
model for other ‘high imprisonment’ societies to follow. The main initiatives include reforms to 
sentencing and penal policy as well as changes to policing practices, all part of a seemingly ‘whole-
system’ approach. Perhaps the most significant lesson from California’s approach is that it almost 
certainly requires more than one round of policy initiatives to successfully reduce prisoner 
numbers.   
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New York 
New York demonstrates the vital role that front-end initiatives and services can play in helping 
drive down imprisonment levels. These include steps to reduce the number of people first entering 
the criminal justice system and pre-trial diversion. The success of Alternatives to Incarceration 
programmes also showcase the importance of providing judges with credible and robust non-
custodial alternatives. Although New York retains a rate of imprisonment that far exceeds any 
country in Western Europe, the initiatives rolled out across the state offer a possible route towards 
change elsewhere.  
 
Texas 
Of the three US states included as case studies in this report, Texas’ alternative approach has 
yielded the most modest reduction in prisoner numbers. However, Texas’ contribution to the 
debate on imprisonment rates is that it provides a clear example that alternative approaches can 
be achieved even in high imprisonment jurisdictions and by those ordinarily hostile to prison 
alternatives. The Justice Reinvestment Initiative and the successes enjoyed by conservative 
criminal justice reform groups in Texas show that it is possible to build cross-party movements 
aimed at reducing imprisonment levels. 
 
Portugal 
Portugal has had one of the highest average imprisonment rates in Europe and has faced a number 
of challenges in relation to prison overcrowding as well rates of death in prison. The country’s move 
to decriminalise the use of illicit drugs, viewing drug use as a public health rather than a criminal 
justice matter, has elicited much international interest. There can be no doubt that this reform has 
diverted many thousands of drug users towards treatment thus reducing some of the burden on 
the criminal justice system. It is also worth noting that there is no evidence of a rise in drug use. 
That said, Portugal’s imprisonment rate has been on the increase since 2008. To the extent that 
drug law reform was an attempt to reduce imprisonment rates then it can only to be considered – 
at best – a partial success. In considering the Portuguese experience in this regard, one key lesson 
is the need for consistent, standardised data collection and evaluation, particularly when 
potentially contentious reforms are being considered or introduced.  
 
Finland 
Finnish penal policy is celebrated throughout Europe and beyond. It has transformed the county’s 
imprisonment rate from being among the very highest in Europe to one of the lowest. Despite a 
brief uptick in the size of the prison population between 1999 and 2005, it has managed to maintain 
its low imprisonment rate over several decades. Three factors would appear to be particularly 
important in helping Finland to achieve and maintain its currently low rate of imprisonment. The 
first is the existence of a strong welfare state that can offer credible and legitimate alternatives to 
prison. The second is a political culture that helps politicians, judges and civil servants ward off the 
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worst excesses of popular punitiveness. Third and finally, Finland has adopted an approach to 
policy making that relies heavily upon academic research and expertise.  
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands provides a fascinating case study of imprisonment in Europe due to the significant 
rise and fall in imprisonment rates over the 20th and early 21st centuries. But it is also a frustrating 
case study in that even whilst it demonstrates that reversing high imprisonment rates is possible, 
there is no consensus as to why this has occurred. Nonetheless there are number of features of the 
penal system in the Netherlands that might well be adopted or adapted for other jurisdictions. They 
include creation of mechanisms to help divert offenders to appropriate services that can both 
uphold public safety and provide an opportunity for rehabilitation, as well as the availability of 
robust, non-custodial options.  
 
In the concluding Chapter Three we highlight a number of common themes that arise from the 
discussion of the case studies and make a number of recommendations: 
 
1. High imprisonment rates are not inevitable 
Welsh politicians, civil society organisations and, indeed, Welsh society as a whole, need to 
consider whether or not it is acceptable to allow the current situation to persist. In short, we 
need a national conversation about our imprisonment rate. 
 
2. Criminal justice reform is not (necessarily) a left-right issue 
Advocates of a national effort to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate should attempt to build 
a cross-party consensus in support of such a move rather than assume that support can only 
be found on one side of the political spectrum. The very substantial (direct and opportunity) 
costs of having Western Europe’s highest imprisonment rate will be of concern to all who 
are interested in the country’s future. 
 
3. Driving down imprisonment rates is a multi-year, multi-phase process 
Advocates of a national effort to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate must recognise that 
theirs would be a ‘long game’. Robust institutionalisation as well as consensus building are 
pre-requisites for success rather than an ‘optional extra’. 
 
4. Driving down imprisonment rates requires a ‘whole system’ approach  
Any future debate about the transfer of criminal justice powers to the National Assembly 
must recognise that any partial transfer will inevitably constrain the ability of devolved level 
politicians and civil servants to develop a ‘whole system’ approach to reducing Wales’ high 
imprisonment rate. 
 
 
5. The operation of welfare and justice systems are intimately interlinked 
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The Welsh Government has recently indicated its desire to initiate a debate about the future 
of the welfare system in Wales, and the Equality, Local Government and Communities 
Committee of the National Assembly is conducting its own enquiry into the subject. All this 
is occurring contemporaneously with the work and forthcoming recommendations of the 
Commission on Justice in Wales. Given inevitable intertwining of the welfare and criminal 
justice systems, the coincidence of these debates offers an opportunity for policy makers to 
think holistically the use of immediate custody in Wales. 
 
6. Both ‘front end’ and ‘back end’ measures can play a useful role in attempts to reduce 
prisoner numbers. 
Any attempt to develop a long-term strategy to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate will 
require much more detailed investigation of the approaches successfully adopted 
elsewhere than has been possible in preparing this report. Nonetheless it is clear that there 
exist a very wide range of potential policies that might be considered for emulation or 
adaptation, with actions focused on all stages in the criminal justice process. It is also 
noteworthy that some of these examples derive from jurisdictions that are not normally 
thought to offer a ‘progressive’ alternative. By confining our attentions to the ‘usual 
suspects’ only, there is a danger that we will miss out on useful experiences elsewhere. 
 
7. Alternatives to Imprisonment 
Developing robust and credible alternatives to imprisonment is central to any strategy 
aimed at reducing imprisonment rates. And, again, there are numerous examples of 
possible approaches that might be adopted or adapted should the political will and 
constitutional structures align is such a way as to facilitate a concerted attempt to address 
Wales’ imprisonment crisis.  
 
8. Data matters 
Whatever the future constitutional configuration around the operation of the justice system 
in Wales, it is vital that reliable and robust data on the operation of that system is readily 
available. This is currently not the case. The requirement for data becomes even more 
imperative should there be a concerted attempt to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate. Not 
least because across what would inevitably be a multi-phase, multi-year, multi-agency 
process, honest evaluation of the success or failure of particular initiatives will wholly reliant 
on the existence of an adequate evidence base. 
 
9. Academic research matters 
Given the current lack on academic interest in the workings of the criminal justice system in 
Wales, there is clearly a need to consider how academic research and engagement with the 
subject can be encouraged, as well as how examples from other jurisdictions can be 
introduced into the Welsh debate. This will become even more important if an effort is to 
made to reform that system and reduce the use of immediate custody in Wales. 
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We conclude by noting the way that popular punitiveness tends to drive up imprisonment rates and 
hinder attempts at reform, noting also that should an attempt be made to reduce Wales’ 
imprisonment rate then there is every reason to believe that this will engender at least some 
popular/populist resistance. We suggest, however, that adopting these recommendations – on 
developing a political consensus in support of reform; on ensuring the availability of robust 
alternatives to imprisonment; on making available trusted data; on encouraging the generation 
and discussion of independent academic evidence; and so on – can play an important role in 
supporting transition away from a high imprisonment society. Conversely, failing to do so makes it 
very difficult to imagine any other outcome other than more of the same. 
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Sentencing and imprisonment in Wales 
 
1.1 Introduction  
We now know more than ever before about the operation of the criminal justice system in the 
unique constitutional circumstances found in Wales. This is largely thanks to the establishment of 
the Commission of Justice in Wales and the way in which that Commission has catalysed and 
provided a focal point for a wholly new discussion about a criminal justice system that remains part 
of a single England and Wales jurisdiction even whilst extensive powers over other aspects of Welsh 
public life have been devolved to the National Assembly for Wales. Evidence collected by the 
Commission provides insights into multiple dimensions of the criminal justice system 
encompassing everything from the operation of the police service to the state of legal education.1 
Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre has sought to make its own contribution by 
publishing previously unavailable data (much of it obtained via Freedom of Information requests) 
as well as providing new analyses of patterns of public spending on the justice system and the state 
of the legal economy in Wales.2 In addition, we have produced a detailed study of the challenges 
facing those operating the criminal justice system across the ‘jagged edge’ of devolved and non-
devolved competences based on extensive interviews with key practitioners.3 
Generating a better understanding how the criminal justice system works and doesn’t work in and 
for Wales is a valuable contribution in itself, of course. But it cannot be overlooked that the 
Commission was established in a context in which the Welsh Government and a majority in the 
National Assembly support the establishment of a Welsh legal jurisdiction and the devolution of 
criminal justice powers. Which in turn raises the question of what Wales could and should try to do 
differently were this to occur? In this report we seek to provide part of the answer to that question 
by focusing in particular on the issue of imprisonment.  
We could, of course, have chosen to consider alternative arrangements for many other elements 
of the current justice system. Indeed, it is to be earnestly hoped that others will do so. Yet we make 
no apologies for our focus on imprisonment as this is the proverbial elephant in the room. Wales 
has the highest imprisonment rate in Western Europe and there is currently nothing to suggest that 
                                                                    
1 Written evidence submitted to the Commission on Justice in Wales can be found here  – 
https://gov.wales/publications?keywords=submissions&All_=All&field_external_organisations%5B1880%5D=1880&p
ublication_type%5B10%5D=10&published_after=&published_before=&_ga=2.56979564.759380701.1556647149-
2106152510.1556543322  
2 See Ifan (2019), Jones (2018), Jones (2019). 
3 See Jones and Wyn Jones (2019). 
1 
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that is about to change (Jones, 2019a; Jones 2019b).4 Speaking at the time of the establishment of 
the Commission which he now chairs, Lord Thomas made it clear that “the real problems facing the 
criminal justice system are those relating to the prison system and to reducing re-offending” whilst 
further pointing out that the “prison population is far too high for the resources that are, or 
realistically can be, committed to prisons”.5 Were different constitutional arrangements to be 
introduced then it seems highly likely that the key priority for Welsh criminal justice policy would 
be to safely reduce our imprisonment rate. Not least because of the opportunity that would provide 
for diverting scarce resources to other priorities such as health, housing and serving tackling 
substance misuse. 
In this report, therefore, we draw attention to the experiences of other jurisdictions that Wales 
might learn from. By focusing on jurisdictions that have introduced measures to reduce high levels 
of imprisonment, the report aims to demonstrate not only that change is possible but that a 
sustainable long-term alternative to a high imprisonment society is a realistic (if challenging) goal 
for public policy in Wales. It also aims to draw attention to the legislative and policy changes that 
have helped secure this goal elsewhere. Of course, it would be naïve to believe that all of these 
policies can simply be transferred into the Welsh context. Even if the requisite powers were 
invested at the Welsh level, much more detailed consideration and research would be required 
before a new legislative and policy framework could be established. But that such different 
societies – with different legal traditions and social norms – have managed change and reform 
should surely give us confidence that Wales, too, could be different. A high imprisonment society 
is not a fate to which we are inevitably condemned. Wales could be different.  
 
1.2 Wales and the highest rate of imprisonment in Western Europe 
There has been a huge increase in the prison population in England and Wales since the 1990s. Even 
if numbers have fallen slightly since their peak in 2011,6 there were still an additional 39,000 people 
in prison in 2018 as compared to 1993. This increase in prisoner numbers reflects an increase in the 
imprisonment rate in England and Wales from 100 per 100,000 in 1995 to 140 per 100,000 in 2018. 
To accommodate rising number of prisoners, 37 new prisons have opened in England and Wales 
since 1985. Yet despite the UK Government’s major investment in prison building to help cope with 
increased prisoner numbers,7 figures from December 2018 suggest that 72 out of the total 118 
                                                                    
4 It is telling that in evidence to the Commission on Devolution in Wales, an HMPPS official asked to respond to Wales’ 
imprisonment rate pointed to the imprisonment rate in Guernsey as being higher. The population of Guernsey is 
smaller than that of Ynys Môn/Anglesey.  
See –  https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-
03/Oral%20evidence%20to%20the%20Justice%20Commission%20from%20HMCTS%2C%20LAA%20and%20HMP
PS.pdf  
5 Lord Thomas, ‘The past and future of law in Wales,’ Speech at the Pierhead Building, 27 October 2017. Text 
available at https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1324756/The-Past-and-the-Future-of-Law-in-
Wales.pdf 
6 This decline has largely been achieved through the increased use of Home Detention Curfew. 
7 See – ‘Deaths in Custody 1978 to 2018 - Table 1.19: Dates of prisons opening/closing from 1978 and major re-roles of 
prisons from 1997’. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/safety-in-custody-quarterly-update-to-september-
2018     
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prisons had a population that exceeded their in-use certified accommodation level (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2019).  
Since 1999, England and Wales has had the highest average rate of imprisonment in Western 
Europe. When these figures are disaggregated, we find that Wales has consistently recorded an 
even higher rate of imprisonment than England (see Figure 1.1). Indeed, research published by the 
Wales Governance Centre showed that between 2010 and 2017 the use of immediate custodial 
sentences marginally increased in Wales (0.3 per cent) even as its use fell in England (16 per cent) 
(Jones, 2019a). Not only does Wales have the highest imprisonment rate in Western Europe, but 
there is little if anything to suggest that that rate will reduce in future. 
Figure 1.1 
Imprisonment rates per 100,000 in Wales and England using home address, 2013 to 2018 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice 
 
The increased prison population in England and Wales can largely be attributed to legislative and 
policy changes introduced by the UK Government and Parliament. These changes include the 
introduction of minimum sentences, an increase in maximum sentences and the creation of new 
criminal offences (Sentencing Council, 2018). An increase in the use of long-term sentences has 
been a major contributing factor in the rise of prisoner numbers. In 1993, 54% of the sentenced 
prison population in England and Wales were serving sentences of less than 4 years. By 2016, this 
rate had fallen to 34% of sentenced prisoners (Ministry of Justice, 2016). In Wales, those sentenced 
to 4 years or more represented 32.6 per cent of the Welsh prison population in June 2017; by 
December 2018 this figure had risen to 38.8 per cent. 
Figure 1.2 
Welsh prisoners broken down by sentence type in 2018 
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Sentence Type   
Remand 456 
Less than 12 months 394 
12 months - 4 years 1,115 
4 years or more 1,817 
Imprisonment for Public Protection 114 
Life 295 
Recall 466 
Non-Criminal 5 
Unknown 26 
Total 4,688 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice 
 
Other legislative and policy factors include sentencing inflation caused by Sentencing Council 
guidelines as well as policies that have led to an increase in the number of individuals recalled to 
custody. The introduction of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 extended statutory supervision 
to offenders sentenced to less than 12 months in custody. Almost 1 in 5 (18 per cent) of the recall 
population in September 2017 were in custody following a recall under the terms of that legislation 
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019). At the end of December 2018, 9.9 per cent of the 
Welsh prison population had been recalled to custody (see Figure 1.2).8   
 
1.3 The case for alternatives 
The soaring rate of imprisonment in England and Wales over the last three decades has fuelled calls 
for improved non-custodial alternatives (e.g. Heard, 2016; Howard League for Penal Reform, 2008; 
Prison Reform Trust, 2017).  There are several dimensions to these calls. 
First, the demand for enhanced options for sentencers has arisen in response to the declining use 
of community sentences. Since 2015, the number of community sentences handed out at courts in 
Wales has fallen by 18 per cent (Jones, 2019b). According to HMI Probation (2019:5) the declining 
use of community sentences reflects the lack of “judicial confidence” in non-custodial alternatives 
since the UK Government introduced its Transforming Rehabilitation agenda in 2015.  
Second, calls for prison alternatives have emerged in response to the prison safety crisis in England 
and Wales. This includes record levels of assault and self-harm as well as self-inflicted deaths in 
prison (e.g. HMI Prisons, 2018; Ministry of Justice, 2019). Previous research published by the Wales 
Governance Centre has demonstrated that self-harm incidents in Welsh prisons increased by 435 
per cent between 2010 and 2018. Over the same period, prisoner-on-prisoner assaults rose by 136 
                                                                    
8 466 Welsh prisoners had been recalled to custody at the end of December 2018. 
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per cent as assaults on staff increased in Welsh prisons from 72 in 2010 to 342 in 2018 (Jones, 
2019b).  
Heightened concerns raised over prison safety have served to accentuate a much longer standing 
set of concerns about the appropriateness of custodial sentences. Despite the intended aims of 
deterrence and rehabilitation, research continues to show that prisoners are likely to be exposed 
to multiple possible harms in prison as a result of institutional failings (e.g. Scott, 2018; Scraton, 
2016). Prisons often fail to provide adequate health care (House of Commons Health and Social 
Care Committee, 2018). Drugs and alcohol are also widely available in prison (HMI Prisons, 2018). 
Moreover, research has consistently shown that prisons do little to reduce the likelihood of future 
offending. The most recent Ministry of Justice data show that almost 1 in 3 (29 per cent) offenders 
released from custody will re-offend in future. This figure climbs to 64.1 per cent for adult offenders 
sentenced to less than 12 months in prison (Ministry of Justice, 2019).  
Finally, support for non-custodial alternatives has solidified in response to the UK Government’s 
continued commitment to further prison expansion. While UK ministers may at the beginning of 
the year expressed support for plans to abolish the use of short-term custodial sentences (e.g. BBC 
News, 2019), the Ministry of Justice has since reiterated its commitment to provide for an 
additional 10,000 prison places in England and Wales.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
As already noted in the Introduction, this report explores and compares six case studies that span 
various examples of jurisdictions which have transitioned – or sought to transition – from high to 
low rates of imprisonment as well as examples of jurisdictions that manage to sustain low rates of 
imprisonment over the long term. These case studies are entirely the product of desk-based 
research by the report’s authors and thus reflect the availability of existing analysis.9 Another key 
limitation of the current report is that space precludes very detailed analysis of what are (inevitably) 
a complex nexus of policies and broader social trends and traditions in some very diverse societies. 
As such, the lessons that we seek to draw out are necessarily provisional. Even so, this study serves 
to illustrate that there is nothing inevitable about high rates of imprisonment. Other jurisdictions 
have managed to successfully lower previously very high rates of imprisonment. Yet other 
jurisdictions can and do manage to maintain much lower rates of imprisonment over the long term. 
Taken together, they offer powerful examples of what Wales could be, were our nation’s political 
will and constitutional structures to align differently.  
                                                                    
9 The lead author also carried out empirical research on the ‘alternatives movement’ in California, New York and 
Texas in 2014. 
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Jurisdictions in transition 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we investigate six case studies of jurisdictions that are attempting to transition from 
high to lower imprisonment rates. They are three US states, namely California, New York and 
Texas, as well as three western European countries: Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal. Before 
we present our analysis, we shall note briefly the rationale for our choice of case studies. 
 
California, New York and Texas 
It is well known that over four decades the US experienced an exponential increase in the number 
of people held in its jails, state prisons and federal institutions. Driven by a range of punitive, ‘get 
tough’ policies enforced by police and sentencers (Travis and Western, 2014) – including mandatory 
prison sentences and ‘truth in sentencing’ laws – the number of people held in state and federal 
prison increased by 425% between 1978 and 2010 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2019).10 Despite 
being home to just 4% of the world’s population, the US criminal justice system is responsible for 
20% of the world’s prisoners (Walmsley, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the expansion of the US penal 
system has attracted considerable academic attention. This includes extensive research into the 
causes of mass incarceration (Garland, 2001a; Pratt et al, 2005; Tonry, 2004) as well as the 
consequences of what DeParle (2007: 33) describes as the “American prison nightmare” (Mauer, 
2006; Pager, 2007; Wacquant, 2002).  
Since 2010, however, the US has born witness to year on year decreases in the national prison 
population, with those states that had contributed so heavily to the rise in prisoner numbers 
actively seeking to reverse course. The efforts of state officials to drive down prisoner levels is now 
generating substantial academic interest (e.g. Gartner et al, 2011; Austin and Jacobson, 2013). In 
this report, we pay specific attention to the legislative and policy developments that have 
contributed to falling prisoner numbers and, in some cases, the closure of state prison facilities.  
Given the fundamental differences in legal system and legal culture, it might be thought that these 
US examples are of little potential relevance to Wales. We disagree. First, the policy lessons: these 
jurisdictions have undertaken on-going, sustained and successful attempts at reform in ‘high 
imprisonment societies’, which means that there are specific policy initiatives from which we can 
                                                                    
10 The number of people held in state and federal prison increased from 307,276 in 1978 to 1,613,803 in 2010. The 
national rate of imprisonment rose from 131 per 100,000 in 1978 to 500 per 100,000 in 2010 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2019). 
2 
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learn. Second, the political lessons: this radical reversal in approach has taken place in what were 
previously some of the most punitive states in the US. Texas, for example, has not suddenly 
become some kind of ‘progressive’ oasis, nor has ‘law and order’ lost its status as a ‘hot button’ 
political issue. Rather, the determination to drive down prison populations appears to be 
overwhelmingly driven by the need to control public spending. Prison is very expensive – a fact that 
implies very substantial opportunity costs either in terms of resources diverted from other public 
services or, indeed, tax cuts. The US examples indicate that fiscal rectitude has the capacity to drive 
support for prison reform. 
 
Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal  
Among our European examples, Finland has successfully transitioned from having one of the 
highest imprisonment rates in Western Europe in the immediate post-war era to one of the lowest. 
This development is the result of deliberate and sustained attempt by policy-makers to drive down 
prison numbers, making Finland an obvious case for inclusion in this study. The Netherlands 
represents a useful case because of its experience of rapid changes in the prison population over 
recent decades. Historically having a low imprisonment rate, the decade after 1995 saw the 
country’s imprisonment rate rise steeply to become one of the highest in Europe. Since then, 
however, there has been a very substantial reduction. Thus, the country offers itself as an example 
of a recent and rapid decline in the imprisonment rate. 
Portugal’s imprisonment rate – at least in western European terms – is high. Its recent, relatively 
‘liberal’ approach to drug policy has garnered much international attention in a context in which 
there is now wide-spread recognition of the limitations of the punitive approach that underpinned 
the ‘war on drugs’. It is included as a case study here, however, not simply because of the interest 
in its approach to the drugs crisis but also because – to the extent that this drugs policy was 
intended to reduce the prison population – Portugal is an example of a reform process that appears 
to have stalled. Here too there are lessons to be learned. 
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2.2 California 
 
 
California was at the epicentre of the US prison boom. During the 1980s, the state’s prison 
population increased by a remarkable 296%. In just ten years, 72,740 prisoners were added to 
California’s state prison population while its jail population – those institutions controlled and run 
by the counties – more than doubled.11 No jurisdiction in the US has ever added as many prisoners 
to its prison population in just one decade. According to Gilmore (2007), California experienced 
seven times as much growth between 1980 and 1991 than in the previous three decades combined. 
The prison population in California continued to rise from 1990 onwards (see Figure 2.1): 65,692 
prisoners were added to the state prison population between 1990 and 2000. The state prison 
population reached its highest ever level of 175,512 in 2006. By this stage California’s rate of 
imprisonment was 483 per 100,000 in 2006, having risen from 98 per 100,000 in 1980. 
To accommodate the rise in prisoner numbers, California embarked on an unparalleled prison 
building programme. Having only built twelve prisons between 1952 and 1964, the state 
government completed the construction of 22 new prisons between 1984 and 2005 (California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2019).12 The state also added thirteen smaller 
community facilities and five prison camps (Gilmore, 2007). As of 2019, California has 34 state 
prison facilities.  
The driving force behind the explosive growth in California’s prison and jail population was the 
introduction of a range of ‘get tough’ policies and initiatives. The 1977 Uniform Determinate 
Sentencing Act reflected the state’s commitment to a more punitive approach. According to one 
critic, the 1977 Act reflected the state’s “formal abdication of any responsibility to rehabilitate” in 
favour of an approach centred upon punishment (Gilmore, 2007: 91).13 The legislation also signalled 
                                                                    
11 The prison population largely consists of those convicted of felony-level offences sentenced to terms of more than 
one year in state custody (though less time may be served). The jail population consists of persons convicted of felonies 
and misdemeanours who are sentenced to less than one-year terms and those awaiting trial who are held in custody. 
From 28,946 people in jail in 1980 to 70,845 in 1990 (Zimring, 1994). 
12 Nine state prisons opened during the 1980s, twelve opened in the 1990s and one prison opened in 2005. 
13 The legislative changes led to an initial decline in prisoner numbers as offenders sentenced to above average 
sentence lengths under the old system were handed reductions as part of the new system (e.g. Zimring and Frase 
1980). 
 
• State Population: 39,557,045 (2018) 
• Prisons: 34 state prisons  
• State Prison Population: 126,428 (2019) 
• Jail Population: 72,496 (2018) 
• Imprisonment Rate: 581 per 100,000 (2018) 
. 
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California’s decision to abandon its indeterminate sentencing structure in favour of a range of 
mandatory prison sentences that led to longer prison sentences for those convicted of a range of 
different offences (Austin, 2016: 91). The spirit of the act was later visible in the introduction of the 
second- and third-strike laws.14 
Figure 2.1 
State prison population in California, 1978 to 2006 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 
 
The best available evidence indicates that the rise in California’s prison population was due to an 
increase in felony convictions leading to imprisonment. Zimring and Hawkins (1994) identified the 
rise in the number of people arrested, convicted and imprisoned for drug offences as largely 
responsible for the population increase at this time. The authors also conclude that crime rates and 
arrests for non-felonies were “not significantly related” to the rising prisoner population in 
California (Zimring and Hawkins 1994: 87). 
Despite the state’s gargantuan prison building programme, California’s prison system was unable 
to keep pace with the relentless increase in the prison population. By 2006, the system was 
operating at 200 per cent of its design capacity (California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, 2006). In 2009, a federal court ruled that the level of medical and mental health care 
in California’s prisons was unconstitutional due to the level of overcrowding. The court’s ruling, 
which was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2011, ordered California to reduce its prison 
population and its level of overcrowding.15 It is in response to this ruling that the California has 
subsequently managed to reduce prisoner numbers and, in a reversal of fortunes, has become one 
of the state’s leading the charge to reverse mass incarceration (The Sentencing Project, 2014). 
                                                                    
14 Other analyses of California’s prison boom have questioned the relationship between rising prisoner numbers and 
the emergence of a profiteering ‘prison industrial complex’ in California (Davis, 2003; Gilmore, 2007). 
15 The Three-Judge Panel ordered the state to develop and implement a plan to reduce the prisoner population in its 
main prison facilities to 137.5 percent of design capacity. 
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California in Recovery: A Response to Overcrowding 
Since its 2006 peak, the state prison population in California has fallen by a quarter (26%). In 2016, 
there were 45,122 fewer people in state prison than had been the case a decade before (see Figure 
2.2).16  California’s imprisonment rate fell from 483 per 100,000 in 2006 to 331 per 100,000 in 2016.17  
Figure 2.2 
State prison population in California, 2000 to 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 
 
This reduction followed the introduction of policies designed to help the state comply with the 
2009 federal court ruling, policies which aimed to reduce both state prisoner numbers and the 
county jail population. The three major initiatives in this regard were the Adult Probation 
Performance Incentive Act, the Public Safety Realignment Act, and Proposition 47. 
 
Senate Bill 678: The Adult Probation Performance Incentive Act 
The state’s first response to the federal court’s ruling was to embark on a course of action designed 
to reform sentencing. The Adult Probation Performance Incentive Act, passed in 2009, offered 
financial incentives to counties to reduce the number of people being sentenced to state custody.18 
More specifically, the Act aimed to financially reward counties that used probation over 
imprisonment with the policy largely targeted at those being recalled to custody for breaching the 
terms of their probation sentence.19 It was estimated that 40 per cent of all state prison admissions 
                                                                    
16 The figures have fallen further in 2019 to 126,428. This reflects a drop of 49,084 since 2006. 
17 The rate recorded in 2016 is similar to the rate in 1992. 
18 Also known as the Community Corrections Performance Incentive. 
19 The funding made available was designated for the development of ‘evidence based programmes’ (Austin, 2016). 
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in 2009 were accounted for by individuals who had violated the conditions of their probation 
sentence or had been arrested for a different crime (Austin, 2016). 
By rewarding counties that reduced their probation revocation rate and those who had maintained 
a low level previously, the implementation of SB 678 helped to divert 27,000 probations between 
2010 and 2013. According to the Administrative Office of the Courts (2012), the policy prevented 
9,500 additional prisoners being held in state prisons. This reduction, however, fell far short of the 
state target as set by the federal court, leading to a second major initiative. 
 
Assembly Bill 109: The Public Safety Realignment Act  
Enacted in October 2011, California’s Public Safety Realignment Act (cf. California Realignment) 
realigned responsibility for non-violent, non-sex-related and non-serious offenders from state to 
county governments. The policy also reduced post-release supervision periods for non-violent, 
non-sex-related and non-serious offenders as well as ensuring that offenders violating the terms of 
their probation or parole could only be sentenced to county jail and not state prison (The 
Sentencing Project, 2014). 
In combination with the changes brought about by SB678, the Act California’s realignment policy 
had a positive effect, precipitating reductions in the state’s prison population of 18.5 per cent, 
30,528 fewer prisoners, between 2010 and 2012. Importantly, this reduction was largely driven by 
a significant decrease in the number of prisoners being admitted to state prisons as opposed to 
county jails. The total number of admissions to state prisons fell by a staggering 71%, or 84,649 
fewer prison admissions, between 2010 and 2012 (see Figure 2.3).  
Figure 2.3 
State prison admissions in California, 2000 to 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 
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One of the central aims underpinning AB 109 was to shift responsibility for low level offenders to 
counties, ensuring that state prison was reserved for those convicted of the most ‘serious offences’. 
As realignment was rolled out, observers noted that jail populations were being “significantly 
affected” by the change (Lofstrom and Raphael, 2013: 2). As the state prison population 
plummeted, the average daily population of California’s county jails increased by some 8,600 
people. For every three prisoners diverted from state prison one was added to the country jail 
population (The Sentencing Project, 2014), a rise that amounted to a 12 per cent increase in the 
number of those incarcerated in California’s jails (Lofstrom and Raphael, 2013). As a consequence, 
in 2014, the state introduced a third major initiative to help ensure that it could meet the federal 
court’s target, this time focusing on county jail numbers. 
 
Proposition 47 
Proposition 47 was introduced in November 2014, having been voted in by almost 60 per cent of 
voters in California. Viewed as the next stage in the state’s effort to reduce the prison population, 
the law reduces the severity of sentences for a range of low-level offences including drug 
possession, shoplifting, theft, and receiving stolen goods. By reclassifying low-level offences from 
felonies to misdemeanours, the maximum sentence available has been lowered to less than one 
year in county jail. A central feature of Proposition 47 is that the law can be applied to offenders 
retrospectively. Since the policy was introduced those convicted of Proposition 47 offences held in 
prison or jail have been able to petition for early release or a reduction in their custodial sentence 
length. 
Figure 2.4 
County jail population in California, 2011 to 2018 
 
 
Source: California Board of State and Community Corrections20 
 
                                                                    
20 See – http://www.bscc.ca.gov/m_data&research.php  
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According to Bird et al (2018: 20), Proposition 47 has “played a significant role” in helping the state 
ensure that prison and jail spaces are reserved for those convicted of the most ‘serious’ offences. 
Since 2014, state prison and county jail populations have “declined substantially” (Bird et al, 2018: 
20). In the year immediately following its introduction, the county jail population fell by 7,851, a 
reduction of 9.6 per cent (see Figure 2.4). The state prison population also fell by 4.8 per cent with 
6,492 fewer people incarcerated in 2015 than in 2014.21 
This combination of policies has drastically reduced the number of people in contact with the 
criminal justice system. Bird et al (2018) discovered that the policy was responsible for a sharp 
decline in the number of arrests, jail bookings and reconvictions. In 2015, arrests for felony property 
offences fell by almost a quarter (24.4 per cent), as felony arrests for drug offences fell by 67.4 per 
cent in just one year (see Figure 2.5). In total, there were 23,836 fewer arrests for property offences 
and 92,425 fewer arrests for felony drug crimes in the year immediately following the new law’s 
introduction.  
Figure 2.5 
Adult felony drug arrests in California, 2008 to 2017 
 
 
Source: Office of the California Attorney General 
 
Proposition 47 has been central to California’s efforts to reduce the correctional population; it is 
only since its introduction that the state managed to get its prison population below the level 
mandated by the federal court in 2009. 
 
                                                                    
21 65 per cent of all net state savings from the measure go towards grants and programmes for mental health and 
substance misuse (Bird et al, 2018). 
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Summary 
Having been at the centre of the US prison boom from the 1980s onwards, in recent years California 
is one of a handful of states to significantly reduce its reliance on custodial imprisonment. Although 
imprisonment in state prisons and county jails remains very high by European standards, the very 
notable reductions made in California since 2010 offer a potential model for other ‘high 
imprisonment’ societies to follow. Arguably the most significant lesson is that reducing prisoner 
numbers may require more than one policy initiative. As well as reforms to sentencing and prison 
policy, this case study demonstrates that changes to policing practices are required as part of a 
‘whole-system’ approach to developing alternatives at all stages of the criminal justice process. 
These issues are reflected upon further in the New York case study that follows. 
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2.3 New York 
 
 
As the US national rate of imprisonment soared at the end of the twentieth century, the state of 
New York underwent its parallel punitive turn. Between 1978 and 1999, the number of people held 
in state prison increased by 256% (see Figure 2.6).22 At its peak towards the end of the millennium, 
New York’s prison population reached 72,899, reflecting a rise in imprisonment rate from 115 per 
100,000 in 1978 to 386 per 100,000 in 1999. This rise was accompanied by an expansion in the prison 
estate, with the number of state and federal prisons in New York more than doubling during the 
1980s and 1990s (Lawrence and Travis, 2004).23 
The distinct features of New York’s punitive approach to penal policy included mandatory drug 
laws, limitations to parole and the introduction of ‘truth-in sentencing’ laws. In 1973, the enactment 
of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, named after Governor Nelson Rockefeller, led to the introduction of 
mandatory prison terms for non-violent drug offenders and minimum sentences of 15 years to life 
for possession and distribution of banned narcotics. Although widely regarded at the time as the 
toughest drug laws in the US,24 the measures had only a modest effect on prisoner levels during 
the 1970s. In the following decade, however, aggressive police enforcement of these draconian 
drug laws (particularly in New York City) contributed significantly to the state’s burgeoning prison 
population (Weiman and Weiss, 2009). During the 1990s, for example, an average of 20,000 
prisoners a year were held in New York prisons because of the Rockefeller drug laws (Drucker, 
2002).  
New York also took advantage of federal government legislation introduced in the 1990s to 
incentivise states to expand their use of imprisonment. The Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act 1994 (c.f. 1994 Crime Bill) authorised £12.5 billion in grants to help states offset 
the costs of mass imprisonment. The programme included financial incentives to states to 
introduce ‘truth in sentencing’ laws designed to limit opportunities for parole and ensure that 
prisoners serve at least 85 per cent of their sentences. New York received $216 million in federal 
                                                                    
22 From 20,459 in 1978 to 72,899 in 1999. 
23 From 30 to 65 prison facilities. 
24 Similar measures were later introduced by other states including Michigan. 
 
• State Population: 19,542,209 (2018) 
• Prisons: 54 state prisons (2019) 
• State Prison Population: 50,288 (2018) 
• Jail Population: 22,828 (2018) 
• Imprisonment Rate: 443 per 100,000 (2018) 
. 
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funds when it introduced its own ‘truth in sentencing’ laws in 1995.25 By 2000, the state prison 
population had increased by 28 per cent and more than 12,000 prison places had been added across 
the state (Eisen and Chettiar, 2015). 
Figure 2.6 
State prison population in New York, 1978 to 2000 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 
 
The legislative and policy changes introduced during this period reflect the state’s abandonment 
of rehabilitative ideals in favour of a more punitive stance. In more recent years, however, New 
York’s approach has moved in an altogether different direction.  
 
Transitioning to prison population reductions: The New York Approach 
During the first decade of the twenty first century, New York “led the nation” in reducing its prison 
population at a time when the US national rate continued to rise (The Sentencing Project, 2014: 
1).26 By 2018, the state prison population was 31 per cent lower than the level reached in 1999, and 
unlike California, this decline in state prisoner numbers was accompanied by a fall in the county jail 
population. Indeed, such has been the decline in prison numbers that, since 2011, 24 prisons and 
                                                                    
25 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1995 increased sentences for first time offenders, removed parole for second time 
violent felony offenders, doubled the minimum sentences which must be served by offenders convicted of committing 
three violent crimes. In 1998, New York State introduced legislation to abolish parole and required that determinate 
sentences be handed out even to first-time violent offenders.  The legislation also introduced longer periods of post-
release supervision. 
26 Along with New Jersey. 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
Wales Governance Centre │ International evidence on driving down imprisonment rates 25 
detention centres have been closed. In February 2019, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced the 
closure of a further three state prisons in the new fiscal year (New York Governor’s Office, 2019). 
Although this reduction in prison population has taken place at a time of falling crime rates,27 Austin 
and Jacobson (2013:19) argue that lower crime levels have not “produced” the decline in prisoner 
numbers. Crucially, according to New York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2013, the changes 
are “neither accident nor coincidence” but reflect a combination of legislative and policy 
developments across New York City.28 Here we will focus briefly on changes relating to policing 
practices in the state’s largest metropolitan area, as well as on sentencing reform. 
 
Policing Practices 
One of the primary factors in the reduction in New York’s prison population has been changes in 
the approach to policing in the state’s largest jurisdiction, New York City (Austin and Jacobson, 
2013).29 During the 1990s, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) reduced the number of 
felony arrests and increased the number of arrests for misdemeanours (see Figure 2.7)30. This trend 
was driven by the NYPD’s focus on ‘broken windows’ and ‘quality of life’ policing and its strategic 
focus on lower-level misdemeanour crimes (e.g. Greene, 1999; Zimring, 2011). Although the rise in 
misdemeanour arrests led to a slight increase in the number of people sentenced to custody for 
misdemeanour convictions in the 1990s, NYPD policy led to a reduction in the number of people 
being convicted and sentenced to prison for felony-level offences in New York City (Austin and 
Jacobsen, 2013). 
Another major driving force behind the reduction in felony arrests has been the state’s revised 
approach to drug enforcement. While the number of felony drug arrests in New York City exceeded 
40,000 per year during the 1990s (The Sentencing Project, 2014), arrests have fallen significantly 
over the last two decades. In 2018, there were 11,245 felony drug arrests in New York City, a 
reduction of more than 56% since 2009.31 Furthermore, even when arrests for drug felonies are 
made in New York City, changes to the state’s approach to drug treatment and sentencing have 
further contributed to a declining prison population.  
 
                                                                    
27 Between 1988 and 2008, the number of felonies reported by New York City fell by 72 per cent (Austin and 
Jacobson, 2013). The reduction in crime outside of New York City fell at a much lower rate (38 per cent) during the 
same period. 
28 See - https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/434-13/mayor-bloomberg-new-york-city-s-incarceration-
rate-hits-new-all-time-low/#/0  
29 Because of its size, policy changes in New York City are largely responsible for state changes. 44% of the entire 
state’s population (19,542,209) live in New York City (8,622,698). 
30 The number of misdemeanour arrests have fallen since 2010. There were 48.8% fewer arrests by the NYPD for 
misdemeanours in 2018 than in 2010. 
31 From 25,880 in 2009 to 11,245 in 2018. The number of misdemeanour drug arrests also fell by 71.9% from 83,058 in 
2009 to 23,366 in 2018. 
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Figure 2.7 
The number of adult felony and misdemeanour arrests in New York City, 2009 to 2018 
 
Source: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
 
Another major driving force behind the reduction in felony arrests has been the state’s revised 
approach to drug enforcement. While the number of felony drug arrests in New York City exceeded 
40,000 per year during the 1990s (The Sentencing Project, 2014), arrests have fallen significantly 
over the last two decades. In 2018, there were 11,245 felony drug arrests in New York City, a 
reduction of more than 56% since 2009.32 Furthermore, even when arrests for drug felonies are 
made in New York City, changes to the state’s approach to drug treatment and sentencing have 
further contributed to a declining prison population.  
 
Sentencing and Alternatives to Incarceration 
Sentencing reforms and the development of a “vibrant” Alternatives to Incarceration (ATI) network 
have played a major corresponding role in New York’s declining prison population (Berman and 
Wolf, 2014: 36). Between 2003 and 2005, the state government introduced changes to the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and effectively repealed these laws by reducing and eliminating the use of 
mandatory sentences in 2009.33 These changes give judges greater discretionary power to send 
felony-level offenders to treatment rather than custody. Research by Waller et al (2013) found that 
in the year following the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, an additional 1,391 people were 
sentenced to court ordered treatment. 
                                                                    
32 From 25,880 in 2009 to 11,245 in 2018. The number of misdemeanour drug arrests also fell by 71.9% from 83,058 in 
2009 to 23,366 in 2018. 
33 The changes also applied retrospectively to those previously handed mandatory custodial sentences (The Sentencing 
Project, 2014). 
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The development of a strong alternatives movement in New York has transformed the sentencing 
options available to judges. In 1984, the state introduced the Classification/ Alternatives to 
Incarceration Act to help incentivise local counties to invest in non-custodial alternatives. The 
legislation requires each county to produce an annual service plan detailing how it intends to reduce 
its reliance on imprisonment as well as providing a summary of its existing alternatives network. 
The plans are developed by a local advisory board which is required to include a range of 
representatives, including a county court judge, the district attorney, a criminal court judge (in 
areas with a population of one million or more) the police, the county director of probation, a 
former offender, a victim of crime and a substance misuse service provider. If the plans are 
approved, the state provides 50 per cent funding for services designed to divert offenders from jail 
terms of at least 180 days.34 
The New York State Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives (NYDPCA) currently funds 
around 165 ATI programmes across the state (NYDPCA, 2019). Described as a “coordinated set of 
programs to which judges may send criminal offenders instead of sentencing them to jail” (Porter 
et al, 2002: 3), ATI programmes require offenders to undertake counselling or treatment for a 
period of six months to a year in order to avoid being sentenced to jail or state prison. These 
programmes consist of pre-trial and post-adjudication services focused on mental health, drug and 
alcohol misuse, community service, specialised programmes and defender based advocacy 
(NYDPCA, 2019). ATIs are delivered by a range of non-governmental and non-profit organisations 
who have played a major role in their development and expansion, including the Women’s Prison 
Association, Osbourne Association, Centre for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services, 
and the Fortune Society. 
Figure 2.8 
State prison population in New York, 2000 to 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
                                                                    
34 Changes introduced to New York’s penal code in 1996 further enhanced the discretionary powers given to judges.  
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The New York State Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives (NYDPCA) currently funds 
around 165 ATI programmes across the state (NYDPCA, 2019). Described as a “coordinated set of 
programs to which judges may send criminal offenders instead of sentencing them to jail” (Porter 
et al, 2002: 3), ATI programmes require offenders to undertake counselling or treatment for a 
period of six months to a year in order to avoid being sentenced to jail or state prison. These 
programmes consist of pre-trial and post-adjudication services focused on mental health, drug and 
alcohol misuse, community service, specialised programmes and defender based advocacy 
(NYDPCA, 2019). ATIs are delivered by a range of non-governmental and non-profit organisations 
who have played a major role in their development and expansion, including the Women’s Prison 
Association, Osbourne Association, Centre for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services, 
and the Fortune Society. 
Research by Porter et al (2002: 66) found that ATI programmes have become a “valuable 
sentencing option” for judges, and their introduction has been supported by an increasing 
accumulation of evidence based policy and an emphasis on testing the effectiveness of treatment 
programmes. Research findings are widely shared with practitioners, legal professionals and the 
judiciary in order to ensure access to the best available evidence on desistance and offending as 
well as raising awareness of the options available to judges.35  
The judiciary has played a vital role in the success of the New York alternatives movement. It has 
offered support to the development of community based courts such as Red Hook Community 
Court in Brooklyn, as well as other problem-solving courts including drug and mental health courts 
(Berman and Wold, 2014). Judges have also benefited from the creation of new court positions such 
as resource managers who work to help prosecutors, attorneys and judges consider the full range 
of sentencing options (Berman and Wolf, 2014; Jacobsen and King, 2013). 
Although concerns have been raised over the extent to which that ATI’s may actually lead to an 
increase in the level of state intervention and supervision,36 there is widespread agreement that the 
ATI network has helped contribute to a reduction in New York City’s imprisonment rate. While that 
level increased throughout the rest of the state, in the City itself the prison disposition rate for 
felony convictions fell from 27% in 1993 to 13% in 2008 (Austin and Jacobson, 2013). The decreases 
in New York City were enough to ensure that the number of prison admissions across the state of 
New York as a whole fell by 23.6% between 2000 and 2016.37 
  
                                                                    
35 The New York Association of Drug Treatment Court Professionals (NYADTCP) is a non-profit organisation whose 
membership includes judges, lawyers, court employees, treatment professionals, law enforcement officers and other 
professionals working in drug courts. NYADTCP arrange regular training programmes for members and helps to 
disseminate latest research and evidence of best practice. See – http://nyadtcp.org/ 
36 Cohen (1985) warned that non-custodial measures may well lead to more people entering the criminal justice 
system through a process of ‘net-widening’. 
37 From 27,601 to 21,081 in 2016 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2019). 
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Summary 
The New York case study demonstrates the vital role that front-end initiatives and services can play 
to drive down imprisonment levels. These include steps to reduce the number of people first 
entering the criminal justice system and pre-trial diversion. The success of ATI programmes also 
illustrates the importance of providing judges with credible and robust non-custodial alternatives, 
something which has been lost in England and Wales since the introduction of Transforming 
Rehabilitation in 2015 (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2019). Although New York retains a rate of 
imprisonment that far exceeds any country in Western Europe, these initiatives offer a possible 
route to delivering change in Wales. A final source of relevance is the emphasis on local initiatives 
as well as state or national initiatives and policies in driving down imprisonment rates 
(Subramanian et al, 2014).  
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2.4 Texas 
 
 
If California spearheaded US prison growth in the 1980s, there can be no doubt that the mantle was 
passed to Texas in the decade that followed. Between 1990 and 2000, the Lone Star State was 
“leading the nation” in imprisoning its own citizens as its prison population increased by 233%. In 
2000, there were 116,677 more people held in state prison than in 1990 as the imprisonment rate 
reached its highest ever level – a staggering 754 per 100,000.38 According to Kaplan et al (2000), 1 
in 5 of all new prisoners added to the US prison population during the 1990s were imprisoned in 
Texas (see Figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9 
Imprisonment rates per 100,000 in the United States and Texas, 1978 to 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
                                                                    
38 This compared to a rate of 293 per 100,000 in 1990. 
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• State Population: 28,701,845 (2018) 
• Prisons: 56 (only prisons and private prisons) 
• State Prison Population: 163,703 (2016) 
• Jail Population: 65,388 (2019) 
• Imprisonment Rate: 891 per 100,000 
. 
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This prison population boom was underpinned by an enormous expansion in the prison estate. In 
1980, following a lawsuit filed by a state prisoner about inhumane prison conditions in Texas, Judge 
William Wayne Justice ruled that the conditions inside state prisons equated to “cruel and unusual 
punishment”. Citing high levels of overcrowding as well as inadequate health care, security, 
sanitation and hygiene, Judge Justice ruled that the conditions inside Texas state prisons violated 
the Eight Amendment of the US Constitution and ordered the state to take action. The suit brought 
against the state became the largest prisoner suit in history at that time (Price and Coleman, 2011).  
In stark contrast to the approach taken by California in 2009 (see 3.2), Texas officials in the early 
1980s attempted to build their way out of the problem. Between 1983 and 1997, the state spent 
$2.3 billion on expanding prison capacity adding no fewer than 108,000 new prison places (The 
Council of State Governments, 2007), constructing 70 new prisons in the 1990s (Price and Coleman, 
2011). However, despite its enormous prison building programme, the state’s policy ultimately 
failed. Ten years later and the state prison population once again exceeded the number of places 
available. Compounding matters, official projections in 2007 forecast that prisoner numbers would 
rise by a further 14,000 by 2012. To meet this demand, the state estimated that an additional $2 
billion would be needed to build and operate new prison facilities (Justice Policy Institute, 2011).  
Although faced with a similar dilemma to the one presented to officials in 1980, in 2007 the state 
decided to embark on an entirely different course of action. To avoid the costs associated with 
further prison building, the state decided to work with outside community organisations and 
embark on the Justice Reinvestment Initiative.    
 
Prison Projections and New Directions? Justice Reinvestment  
Research into the causes of Texas’ rising prison population between 1997 and 2006 identified three 
main contributory factors. First, a large number of people were being recalled to custody because 
of probation revocations. Second, an insufficient number of prisoners were being approved for 
parole. And third, a reduction in state funding for substance misuse and mental health services had 
contributed to a 2,000 place-shortfall in the number of treatment beds available in the community 
(The Council of State Governments, 2007). 
In 2007, a bipartisan team of lawmakers developed a number of initiatives to address probation 
revocations, the low use of parole, and substance misuse and mental health treatment services. In 
response to these proposals, in May 2007 the State Legislature enacted four pieces of legislation 
that sought to reduce the number of people held in prison as well as those returning to prison 
following release.39 This legislation helped to redirect state funds away from prison into outside 
treatment and diversion services, services which included 800 new beds for those under probation 
supervision with substance misuse needs; 1,400 new beds to divert probation and parole violators 
from prison; 3,000 slots for outpatient substance misuse treatment for offenders on probation 
supervision; and 300 new beds in a half-way house for offenders under parole supervision (The 
Council of State Governments, 2007). To address Texas’ law parole rate, the state established a 
                                                                    
39 House Bill 1 (2007); House Bill 1678 (2007); House Bill 3736 (2007); and Senate Bill 166 (2007). 
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maximum limit for parole caseloads to ensure proper supervision arrangements; expanded the use 
of drug courts to help divert offenders convicted of minor crimes towards treatment; and reduced 
probation terms for drug and property offenders to ensure that they receive treatment and 
supervision (The Council of State Governments, 2007).   
The changes made since 2007 have since been supported by legislation that has delivered 
“significant improvements” to the prisoner re-entry system in Texas (Smith, 2016: 1). In 2015, the 
legislature gave funding for additional re-entry case managers and expanded the level of intensive 
support available to offenders suffering from mental health issues (Smith, 2016). 
Between 2005 and 2009, the number of pardons and paroles in Texas increased by 3 per cent 
(Justice Policy Institute, 2011). In addition, the number of offenders being returned to custody for 
parole violations has fallen by 20 per cent since 2010 and by almost 50 per cent since 2006 (Smith, 
2016).  
Figure 2.10 
State prison population in Texas, 2004 to 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
Overall the state prison population in Texas has seen a modest reduction since 2007. Since reaching 
its highest ever level in 2010, the state prison population has fallen by 5.7%.40 The imprisonment 
rate declined during the same period from 678 to 563 per 100,000. This population decrease has led 
to the closure of a number of correctional facilities: 7 institutions were closed between 2011 and 
2013 (Porter, 2014)41 and the closure of a further 4 state facilities was announced in 2017 (Texas 
State Senate, 2017).  
                                                                    
40 There were 8,087 fewer people held in state prison in Texas in 2016 than 2007. 
41 Texas closed a state prison for the first time in its history in 2012. 
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Conservative Criminal Justice Reform 
The policies introduced in 2007 represent the “most substantial redirection” in Texas’ correctional 
policy since the beginning of the prison boom (The Council of State Governments, 2007: 5). For 
some, the most intriguing aspect of the Texas ‘success story’ is that such a change occurred in such 
a deeply conservative state.  Indeed, Texas has secured a Republic Trifecta since 2003 with 
majorities in the state senate, House of Representatives and the governorship. Central to the 
‘rehabilitative turn’ in Texas was that the Republican controlled legislature was able to turn to 
conservative criminal justice reform experts. Having emerged in response to the neglect shown by 
conservatives to criminal justice reform, the Right on Crime initiative has played a crucial role in 
developing a conservative agenda around criminal justice reform and, perhaps unexpectedly, a 
campaign against further prison building. 
The research evidence generated by the conservative criminal justice movement has been key to 
the reform efforts in Texas for two reasons. First, the evidence base helped state representatives 
identify what changes were required when faced with the prospect of a further rise in the prison 
population from 2007 to 2012 (Rosenberg, 2017). This included the need to tackle the state’s low 
parole rate and improve re-entry services. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Right on 
Crime initiative helped to create a political space for conservative representatives and law makers 
to adopt a ‘smart’ rather than ‘tough’ approach to criminal justice. For example, polling research 
carried out by Right on Crime has been used to help Republican officials understand how 
conservative voters feel about reforming the criminal justice system. This research, alongside the 
work being undertaken by liberal organisations including the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, has 
helped the reform movement to improve its messaging to conservative voters, the media and state 
officials.42 This has been key in allowing representatives the space in which to develop alternative 
approaches in Texas. 
The successes enjoyed by the Right on Crime initiative in Texas have spread to other states.43 The 
movement has advocated for reforms in 38 states and has helped to pass youth justice reform 
legislation, overhaul civil asset forfeiture laws, close prisons, and encourage justice reinvestment 
programmes (Right on Crime, 2019). In 2015, the then UK Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, visited 
Texas to learn more about the ‘rehabilitative revolution’ and to explore the possible transfer of 
conservative reform efforts to the UK (Dart, 2015). 
 
Summary 
Of the three US states discussed in this chapter, Texas’ alternative approach has yielded the most 
modest reduction in prisoner numbers. Indeed, if the population continues to fall at the current rate 
it will take a further 65 years for Texas’ prison population to reach its 1990 level. However, Texas’ 
contribution to the debate on prison alternatives is that it provides a clear example that alternative 
                                                                    
42 The research identified that support for criminal justice reform would come from social conservatives, fiscal 
conservatives and those interested in a ‘limited government’ philosophy.   
43 Including Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. 
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approaches can be achieved even in high imprisonment jurisdictions that have been ordinarily 
hostile to prison alternatives. The Justice Reinvestment Initiative and the successes enjoyed by 
conservative criminal justice reform groups in Texas demonstrate the possibility of building 
bipartisan or cross-party movements to deliver alternative approaches to penal policy.  
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2.5 Portugal 
 
 
Along with England and Wales, Scotland and Spain, Portugal has one of the highest average rates 
of imprisonment in Western Europe (see Appendix One). Over the past two decades, in response 
to criticism for a high number of deaths in prisons in 1997 as well as the high rate of imprisonment, 
the country has introduced several alternative sanctions and probation reforms. Initially, these 
reforms were associated with a reduction in the total number of prisoners (European Prison 
Observatory, 2015). More recently, however, prison numbers have returned to the levels observed 
at the start of the century. Portugal therefore offers an important case with respect to managing 
prison population rates, namely a case of stalled reform. 
 
Prison Reform 
In 2004, a report commissioned by the Portuguese government in response to growing concerns 
about prison conditions set out a 12-year action plan to align the Portuguese prison system with 
European standards. New legislation was introduced in 2007 for an Enforcement of Sentence Code. 
Alternatives to prison were also bolstered in 2007 (Law no.59/2007) to enhance sentencing 
proportionality, to promote rehabilitation, and to reduce reoffending (European Prison 
Observatory, 2015). At the same time, the former Institute of Social Rehabilitation was replaced 
with the General-Directorate of Social Rehabilitation to restructure the Portuguese Probation 
Department. In 2012, this became the General-Directorate of Social Rehabilitation and Prison 
Services (European Prison Observatory, 2015).  
Despite institutional and measure reforms, the prison population rate increased to 130 per 100,000 
in 2012 and then returned to the same level as the start of the century, 126 per 100,000, in 2018. 
The prison system has also been criticised for overcrowding issues with 113 prisoners for every 100 
places (Aebi et al, 2018b). 
The Portuguese system offers several alternative options to imprisonment including community 
service, suspended sentences, substitution of prison sentences of up to a year with a fine, house 
 
• Population: 10,291,027 (2017) 
• Prisons: 49 (2017) 
• Prison Population: 12,900 (2018) 
• Imprisonment Rate: 126 per 100,000 (2018) 
. 
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arrest, incarceration by free days,44 and semi-incarceration regimes (European Prison Observatory, 
2015). However, the most widely recognised alternative approach associated with the Portuguese 
system is its policy on decriminalisation of illicit drugs. This case study will focus on that reform. 
Figure 2.11 
The imprisonment rate in Portugal, 1975 to 2000 
 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research  
 
 
Decriminalisation of Drugs 
From an international perspective, the highest profile reform introduced in Portugal was the 
decriminalisation of illicit drugs. At the end of the 1990s, Portugal had a notorious drug problem 
supposedly due to the open availability of heroin. This led to significant increases in infectious 
diseases, particularly HIV and AIDS, and drug related deaths with a peak of 369 in 1999 (Hughes et 
al. 2010: 1001; van Beusekom et al. 2002).  
Following a government report by the Commission for a National Anti-Drug Strategy in 1998, a 
new approach was adopted. The Commission brought together legal, medical, and social 
professionals and recommended that decriminalisation of drug use and possession would allow the 
government to focus on prevention, harm reduction, treatment, and helping people to maintain 
their social connections (Domoslawski, 2011). Law enforcement and health experts viewed 
criminalisation as part of the problem rather than the solution because addicts were not ready to 
come forward for treatment due to the stigma of criminalisation (Hughes and Stevens, 2010). 
Although the ability to divert offenders towards treatment had existed since drug control 
                                                                    
44 Offenders sentenced to a maximum of one year in custody can served their sentences over weekends. Up to a 
maximum of 72 periods, with each period having minimum 36 and a maximum of 48 hours which are counted as 5 
days of continuous incarceration (European Prison Observatory, 2015). 
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legislation was introduced in 1993 (Decree-Law n.15/93), the Commission recommended going 
further by removing as many users as possible from the ambit of the criminal justice system, 
ensuring that alternative sanctions for drug treatment were used effectively (EMCDDA, 2011).   
A new National Strategy for the Fight Against Drugs was introduced in 1999, and this remains the 
main strategic document for drug control in Portugal (Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
n.46/1999).45 It sets out five principles that underpin and guide the strategy: internationalisation of 
the drug problem, humanism, pragmatism, prevention, and community involvement in drug policy 
(EMCDDA, 2011). Decriminalisation was a part of a wider strategy that also put emphasis on 
reducing harm, extending treatment, prevention, and reintegration. This policy was aimed at 
demand reduction and supply reduction and was put into action through the first National Action 
Plan of the Fight Against Drugs and Drug Addiction – Horizon 2004.46  
 
Law n.30/2000 of November 2000 
Law n.30/ 2000 gave force to the decriminalisation aspect of the strategy.47 It sought to make the 
use of illicit drugs a public order-administrative violation rather a criminal offence, by moving users 
out of the criminal justice system. As such it represented a radical change from the preceding legal 
structure as well as the policies being pursued in other European states, including neighbouring 
Spain (van Beusekom etal.2002). It should be underlined, however, that decriminalisation is not 
legalisation. The Portuguese approach is best understood as a focus on reducing harm and 
introducing proportionate punishment (Domoslawski, 2011).  
The administrative violation is administered by Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction 
that work regionally. Each Commission is comprised of three members that must include a legal 
member, a medical professional, and a third member who may be another medical professional or 
a social worker (Lei n.30/ 2000, Article 7). These Commissions have a range of options of penalties 
and sanctions available to them depending on whether or not the perpetrator is an addict. If this is 
the case, and the perpetrator agrees to treatment, the sanction process can be suspended and 
arrangement for treatment can be made (Lei n.30/ 2000, Articles 11-12). Commissions may also 
impose fines or impose restrictions on perpetrators such as restricting the areas they can visit (Lei 
n.30/ 2000, Articles 15-18). In coming to their decisions, the law states that Commissions need to 
consider the type of drug being used, whether or not it was taken in public, and how often the 
perpetrator uses drugs (Lei n.30/2000, Article 15). Penalties or accompanying measures can last 
between one month and three years (Lei n.30/ 2000, Article 24).  
In 2017, 11,329 people were involved in litigation under Lei n.30/2000, representing a new high 
watermark since the offence was introduced and an increase of some 80% over the period of a 
decade. In 2017, around 10% were classed as addicts (SICAD, 2019). For those classed as addicts, 
                                                                    
45 The current strategy is the National Plan for the Reduction of Addictive Behaviours and Dependencies 2013-20. It is 
supported by two other strategic documents: National Plan Against Drugs and Drug Addiction 2005-12 and National 
Plan for the Reduction of Addictive Behaviours and Dependencies 2013-20. 
46 The current Action Plan 2013-16 is in force New action plans were introduced in November 2005, May 2010,  
47 Harm and risk reduction measures were introduced through law no.183/2001. 
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the most common ruling was a suspension to allow the perpetrator to undertake treatment (67% 
in 2012) (SICAD, 2013: 117)48. Between 2007 and 2012, around 4-6% of perpetrators were 
recidivists, and 88% of those only registered one relapse in a year (SICAD, 2013). 
Figure 2.12 
Litigation for Administrative Offences for Illicit Drugs (Lei n.30/2000) 
 
Year 
Number of 
Offenders 
2007 6,268 
2008 6,044 
2009 7,122 
2010 6,826 
2011 6,507 
2012 7,817 
2013 7,900 
2014 8,389 
2015 9,620 
2016 10,052 
2017 11,329 
 
Source: SICAD (2019)  
 
For perpetrators that are not considered to be addicts, the majority of Commission decisions (67% 
in 2012) result in provisional suspension (SICAD, 2013). Laqueur (2015) highlights the way in which 
Commissions are increasingly being required to deal with younger non-addicted perpetrators for 
cannabis-related offences which amounted to 76% of cases in 2009. She notes the strain on scarce 
resources created by such cases as a result of the rules on Commission composition.  
Strain on resources has been identified by others as a factor impeding the work of the Commissions 
(Pinto, 2010). An evaluation of the 2008-2013 action plan identified that a lack of quorum was 
responsible for delays in the system (SICAD, 2013; Laqueur, 2015). Pinto (2010) also highlighted 
that perpetrators being referred for treatment were often already undergoing treatment or re-
starting treatment. In 2012, only a fifth (21%) of perpetrators who were sent for treatment had not 
received any form of treatment in the past (SICAD, 2013).  
Offenders convicted of having more than 10 days-worth of drugs available for consumption fall 
under the ambit of Decree-Law n.15/93 and the courts system, rather than Law n.30/2000. There 
has been a substantial increase in the numbers falling into this category (if from an initially low 
level) from 24 in 2006 to 388 in 2012. These were mostly sanctioned with a fine (SICAD, 2013).  
The effects of decriminalisation 
                                                                    
48 Serviço de Intervenção nos Comportamentos Aditivos e nas Dependências (SICAS) 
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The decriminalisation of illicit drugs has seen a 60% reduction in the number of people sent to a 
criminal court for drug offences (Drug Policy Alliance, 2015). The proportion of drug related 
offenders in Portuguese prisons had also decreased from 44 % in 1999 to 22% in 2008 (Hughes et 
al. 2010: 1010; Laqueur 2015). Writing in 2010, Hughes and Stevens highlight the way in which the 
number of offenders being dealt with via the administrative offence rather than the criminal 
offence route appeared to be relatively consistent (between 6,000-8,000) with no overall increase 
in the rate of contact between drug users and the police. The available (English) literature does not 
yet offer an explanation for the proliferation in numbers since 2014. 
Initially at least, it was possible to discern a direct impact of decriminalisation on incarceration rates 
in Portugal. Between 2000 and 2008  there was a fall in the imprisonment rate from 126 per 100,000 
to 102, and the number of offenders who reported using heroin before entering prison also fell from 
27 per cent in 2001 to 13 per cent in 2007 (Hughes and Stevens, 2010). Since 2008, however, there 
has been a notable rise in the imprisonment rate with levels returning to their pre-reform era (see 
Figure 2.13). Again, the extant English language literature does not seem to offer an explanation 
for this trend. 
Beyond the use of immediate custody, decriminalisation has been linked to tangible benefits in 
terms of public health.49 Most notably, new cases of HIV among drug users decreased from 1,575 
to 78 between 2000 and 2013. The number of drug-induced deaths also declined from 80 to 16 
between 2001 and 2012 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2015), and there have been reported decreases in 
infections such as hepatitis B and C (Greenwald, 2009). 
Despite these public health benefits, researchers remain divided in their assessment of the overall 
impact of Portugal’s drug law reform. In part this is due to researchers adopting fundamentally 
different starting points for their analyses. Pinto (2010), for example, argues that drug dependency 
should be understood as a psychological rather than a medical issue and so requires a different 
approach to the decriminalisation implemented in 2001. Hughes and Stevens (2012) have 
cautioned against overemphasising the decriminalisation reform per se, insisting that it must be 
viewed and evaluated as one part of a wider national drugs strategy. They have also, quite rightly, 
highlighted the inherent difficulties in attributing societal change to a single policy innovation. 
Another key issue – and source of contention – is data. Beusekom et al (2002) and Hughes and 
Stevens (2010, 2012) emphasise the requirement for robust data, in particular where policy areas 
being analysed are characterised by highly polarised views. Portugal’s National Plan for the 
Reduction of Addictive Behaviours and Dependencies 2013-2020 now prioritises investment in 
standardised data collection and indicators, as well as promoting research and evaluation, in order 
to help identify trends and ensure effective knowledge application in future policy making 
(EMCDDA, 2018). 
Figure 2.13 
The imprisonment rate in Portugal, 2000 to 2018 
                                                                    
49 Support for the national drug policy comes from the Directorate General for Intervention on Addictive Behaviours 
and Dependencies (SICAD) which is part of the Ministry of Health. 
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Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
 
 
Summary 
Portugal has had one of the highest average imprisonment rates in Western Europe and has faced 
a number of challenges in relation to prison overcrowding as well rates of death in prison (Aebi et 
al. 2018b). The country’s decision to decriminalise the use of illicit drugs, viewing drug use as a 
public health rather than a criminal justice matter, has elicited much international interest. There 
can be no doubt that this reform has diverted many thousands of drug users towards treatment 
thus reducing the burden on criminal justice agencies. It is also worth noting that there is no 
evidence of a rise in drug use (Hughes and Stevens, 2010). That said, Portugal’s imprisonment rate 
has been on the increase since 2008. To the extent that drug law reform was an attempt to reduce 
imprisonment rates, it can only to be considered – at best – a partial success.  
In considering the Portuguese experience in this regard, one key lesson is the need for consistent, 
standardised data collection and evaluation, particularly when potentially contentious reforms are 
being considered or introduced. This lesson would seem particularly germane in a Welsh context in 
which even basic data is at a premium. 
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2.6 Finland 
 
In 2018, Finland recorded an imprisonment rate of 51 per 100,000 people, an extremely low rate 
bettered only by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Faeroe Islands in the whole of Europe (Walmsley, 
2018). What makes the Finnish case particularly interesting is that this was not always the case. 
Rather, for most of its post-second world war history, Finland recorded far higher imprisonment 
rates than many other European countries. Indeed, in 1950, its imprisonment rate was 187 per 
100,000 and remained amongst the highest in Europe into the 1970s (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007). 
Figure 2.14 
The prison population in Finland, 1950 to 2000 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
 
To help drive down its use of imprisonment, Finland embarked on a deliberate policy of 
decarceration beginning in the mid-1960s (Lappi-Seppälä, 2012a).50 Between 1966 and 2006, 33 
                                                                    
50 The country reached considerably lower levels in the 1990s which have broadly been maintained to date. 
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legislative changes were made affecting the imprisonment rate, with no fewer than 24 of these 
reforms purposively introduced to reduce prisoner levels. During this period, decreasing the prison 
population and reducing reoffending were two of the main goals of Finnish criminal justice policy 
(Tourunen et al, 2012) 
The aim of decarceration has remained central to Finnish penal policy for four decades, defined by 
“systematic and thorough reforms to sentencing legislation” aimed at aligning criminal justice 
policy with the government’s general social policy (Lappi-Seppälä, 2012a). In practical terms, 
reforms included upper limits of proportionality in sentencing (accompanied by reductions in 
sentences), the eventual replacement of short custodial sentences with fines, an increase in the use 
of suspended sentences, and the introduction of community service in the early 1990s. By 2012, 
community service had replaced 35% of short-term prison sentences (up to eight months) (Lappi-
Seppälä, 2012a). Crimes such as drink driving, property offences and defaulting on fines were no 
longer punished by imprisonment, and tools such as parole and early release were expanded in 
order to further drive down the prison population.51 According to Lahti (2017), the values 
underpinning Finland’s approach can be characterised as a combination of a rational pragmatist 
calculation around the costs-benefits of incarceration, and a liberal desire for a ‘humane’ criminal 
justice system. 
Figure 2.15 
The imprisonment rate in Finland, 1950 to 2000 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
 
A ‘bump in the road’? 
Despite Finland’s previous successes in reducing its prison population, between 1999 and 2006 
prisoner levels increased for the first time in decades (see Figure 2.16). Lappi-Seppälä (2012a) 
                                                                    
51 The use of imprisonment for young offenders also became restricted to exceptional cases from the late 1980s 
onwards. 
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attributes the increased use of imprisonment to a general sense of insecurity in a Finnish society 
emerging from the economic recession of the 1990s. Even though recorded crime levels remained 
stable, fear of crime increased with a concomitant rise in support among the judiciary for a tougher 
approach to those convicted of particular offences. Tougher sentences were introduced for crimes 
including domestic violence, rape, human trafficking and child abuse, as well as drug offences and 
aggravated assault. The average custodial sentence length doubled during this period (Lappi-
Seppälä, 2012a). 
Figure 2.16 
The imprisonment rate in Finland, 2000 to 2018 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
 
However, in 2007 the Ministry of Justice again decided to embark on a course of action aimed at 
reducing prisoner numbers by shifting away from offence specific legislation towards a whole 
system approach. The package of measures introduced by the government included ‘fairer’ 
sentences, the development of local crime prevention networks, the expansion of community 
sentences, and greater use of substance misuse programmes instead of criminal sanctions (Lappi-
Seppälä, 2012a). Although the policy shift was responsible for a reduction in the annual prisoner 
caseload (between 2005 and 2010) for those convicted of fine defaults, property offences, drink 
driving and drug offences, longer and tougher sentences were retained for those convicted of 
sexual offences. 
 
Embedding change – the role of politics and society    
The overarching story of Finnish penal policy is one of gradual liberalisation of sentencing practice 
and of increasing commitment to alternatives to imprisonment. It is an approach that has seen the 
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imprisonment rate fall to one of the lowest levels in Europe. Finland has been able to accomplish 
this because of the existence of cross-party political support for change as well as a societal 
consensus about the purpose and role of the criminal justice system (Lappi-Seppälä, 2012a). There 
are three other factors to which it is worth drawing specific attention to, all of which have either 
reinforced or coincided with the decline in the Finnish prison population. 
First, Finland adopted the Scandinavian welfare state model during the same decade that the 
country’s imprisonment rates began to fall. This was characterised by substantial growth in public 
spending, a reduction in economic inequality, the development of a comprehensive social security 
system and public services, and a dramatic growth in overall GDP. Lappi-Seppälä (2012a) argues 
that the existence of a strong welfare state – and the positive social indicators that might be 
expected to accompany it – helped to create practical welfare-grounded alternatives to 
imprisonment that were seen as legitimate by the judiciary, criminal justice practitioners, and the 
rest of society. The reverse argument has been used to explain higher rates of imprisonment in the 
United States (Reiman and Leighton, 2010; Wacquant, 2009).  
A second factor supporting Finnish criminal justice reform has been the country’s political culture 
and media. Finland’s consensual political culture is not without inter-party antagonism, but 
contains structural features such as proportional representation and coalition governments that 
serve to ameliorate tensions, thus helping to maintain a relatively settled consensus on maintaining 
low prison rates while ensuring that crime does not become a central issue in election campaigns 
(Lappi-Seppälä, 2007). Relatedly, the role of the media has been crucial. Lappi-Seppälä (2007: 211) 
suggests that the Finnish media has often adopted a “relatively sober approach” to the reporting 
of crime. This has helped ensure that the country has avoided some of the policy changes 
associated with popular punitiveness (e.g. Newburn, 2007; Pratt et al, 2005). 
The third factor which has buttressed Finnish penal reform is the role played by academic research. 
If Finland’s political system is in general one that “appreciates expert knowledge” (Lappi-Seppälä, 
2012a: 220), penal policy is “exceptionally expert led” (Ekunwe and Jones, 2012: 176). While the 
approach in England and Wales may be described as “politically opportunist and ad hoc” in nature, 
the emphasis on research based policy in Finland has allowed for an altogether different approach 
to flourish (Pratt, 2008: 134). The influence of academia in shaping penal policy can be traced back 
to the time immediately preceding the first reforms, “when academics in the 60s argued criminal 
policy should be part of social policy” (Lappi-Seppälä, 2012b).  
The key criminological research centre in Finland is the Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, 
extant in some form since 1963. The institute is hosted by the University of Helsinki but was 
originally established by the government and is regulated by statute. The law sets out the 
institute’s tasks and ensures that its research meets the needs of the Ministry of Justice.52 Other 
institutions supporting the development of Finnish criminal justice policy include the Scandinavian 
Research Council for Criminology, which is funded by the Ministries of Justice of Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and provides research and advice to those governments.53 Each 
                                                                    
52 See – Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy (2019).  
53 See –  Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology (2019) 
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country, with the exception of Iceland, hosts a Nordic Crime Prevention Council or equivalent 
agency which (in Finland) brings together the civil service, local government, academia and other 
civil society actors within a single agency accountable to the Ministry of Justice.54 
  
Summary 
Finnish penal policy is celebrated throughout Europe and beyond. It has transformed the county’s 
imprisonment rate from being among the very highest in Europe to one of the lowest. Despite a 
brief uptick in the size of the prison population between 1999 and 2005, it has managed to maintain 
its low imprisonment rate for several decades. Three factors would appear to be particularly 
important in helping Finland achieve and maintain its currently low rate of imprisonment. The first 
is the existence of a strong welfare state that can offer credible and legitimate alternatives to 
prison. The second is a political culture that helps politicians, judges and civil servants ward off the 
worst excesses of a popular punitiveness. Third and finally, Finland has adopted an approach to 
policy making that relies heavily upon academic research and expertise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
54 See –  National Council for Crime Prevention in Finland (2019)  
46 Wales Governance Centre │ International evidence on driving down imprisonment rates 
2.7 The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands is an example of a country that has, in recent times, seen very significant 
fluctuation in its imprisonment rate with rapid increases followed by a substantial decline. As a 
result, it is a particularly fascinating case study which helps us to understand the political and legal 
factors underpinning changes in international imprisonment rates. 
Between the end of the second World War and the mid-1970s the ‘Dutch Model’ of imprisonment 
was a characterised by a non-punitive approach focused on rehabilitation and prisoners’ rights. 
According to Christie (2000), this approach, centred upon tolerance and leniency, was in part the 
result of the personal experience of post-war political leaders many of whom had been incarcerated 
during the war years (Downes and van Swaaningen, 2007). The ‘Utrecht School’ of criminologists, 
lawyers and psychiatrists were also influential in setting an agenda that focused above all on 
rehabilitation and resocialisation (Downes and van Swaaningen, 2007).  
During this period, the Netherlands’ ‘reductionist’ penal philosophy established a series of ‘shields’ 
designed to prevent the expansion of imprisonment (Downes and van Swaaningen, 2007: 32). 
These ‘shields’ included practices such as the waiver of prosecutions, a waiting list for prison places, 
the use of pardons, and generous home leave. Although the existence of waiting lists and a lack of 
prison capacity might be interpreted as casting doubt on the reliability of the published 
imprisonment rates during this period (Tak, 1999), Downes argues that these ‘shields’ were 
consistent with the general approach to imprisonment in the Netherlands at the time (Downes, 
1988). The subsequent forty years to the early twenty-first century, however, saw the country’s 
imprisonment rate change from being one of the lowest in Western Europe during the 1960s and 
1970s, to become one of the highest. 
 
Dismantled Shields and Rising Prisoner Numbers  
Declining faith in the previously liberal approach led to a significant shift in the principles underlying 
principles of Dutch penal policy in the 1990s. The first International Crime Victims Survey in 1989 – 
followed by a wider survey in 1992 – found that the Netherlands had one the highest crime rates in 
the developed world. According to Downes and van Swaaningen (2007: 52-54), this rate served to 
erode public trust in the traditional liberal approach that had previously “commanded respect”. 
According to Downes and van Swaaningen (2007: 31), former commitments to resocialisation and 
 
• Population: 17,125,417 (2019) 
• Prisons: 38 (2019) 
• Prison Population: 10 464 (2017) 
• Imprisonment Rate: 61 per 100,000 (2018) 
. 
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restorative justice were replaced by “managerial, instrumental, and incapacitative measures” 
underpinning a far more punitive approach. By 2006, the Netherlands had one of the highest rates 
of imprisonment across Western Europe (see Figure 2.17). 
One explanation for the increased use of imprisonment in the Netherlands was the rise in serious 
and violent crime experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s (Allen, 2012; van Swaaningen, 
2013). Between 1970 and 1985, the number of crimes recorded by the police increased from 
265,000 to over a million. Violent crime also rose from 15,800 incidents in 1979 to 90,900 in 2000; 
the latter rate equivalent to 700 violent crimes per 100,000 people (Allen, 2012: 12). As a result, this 
period saw an increase in the custody rate for violent crime with 21 per cent of those convicted of 
violent offences sentenced to custody in 1995 compared to 16 per cent in 1985. The custody rate 
for drug offences also rose during this period from 22 per in 1985 cent to 34 per cent ten years later 
(Allen, 2012: 12). In some quarters this was seen as reflecting the way that, by the 1980s, the 
Netherlands had become a key node in the international drugs trade and had secured a reputation 
as being something of a haven for organised crime. This perception led to increasing international 
pressure on the Netherlands to reform its drug policy (Christie, 2000: 58).  
The removal of some of the traditional “shields” opened the door to an increase in the prison 
population and a considerable programme of prison expansion. A key development was the 
overturning of the principle of one prisoner to a cell, which immediately increased the capacity of 
the prison estate (Downes and van Swaaningen. 2007: 60). According to Downes and van 
Swaaningen (2007: 60):  
Figure 2.17 
The imprisonment rate in the Netherlands, 1980 to 2018 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
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The one to a cell principle was arguably the most important shield against undue expansion of 
imprisonment, and the fear of losing its relatively humane character, explains the stubborn 
resistance of prison governors and staff to its attenuation, a resistance that has now evidently been 
overwhelmed.  
The state’s response to drug trafficking was an important contributory factor to the rise in prisoner 
numbers. Tighter screening at Schiphol airport, for example, resulted in a significant increase in 
imprisonment for drug trafficking offences. The Emergency Law Drug Couriers in 2002 enhanced 
the state’s power to detain drug couriers and led to the construction of new detention centres 
(Downes and van Swaaningen, 2007). Although the government would later roll back this policy, 
these detention centres became part of the prison estate and led to a “permanent loss in quality of 
the regular prison system” across the Netherlands (Downes and van Swaaningen, 2007: 65). 
Cuts to the welfare state also contributed to rising prisoner numbers. A lack of capacity in the 
welfare system meant that social problems were increasingly picked up and dealt with by the 
criminal justice system (van Swaaningen, 2013: 344). The government’s previous approach to drug 
offences – which emphasised “harm reduction” and public health – was also replaced during the 
1990s with a more punitive stance (van Swaaningen, 2013: 344).  
According to Christie (2000), the same period also saw a decline in the intellectual tradition that 
had once characterised Dutch criminology’s strong cultural and humanistic bent. A different type 
of penal expert emerged, including statisticians, risk-analysts, and managers, whose narrower 
agenda focused on providing advice, and emphasising targets and control, rather than exploring 
broader sociological questions (van Swaaningen, 2013). Alongside this change, the focus of policy-
making moved away from a reliance on the views of criminologists and criminal justice 
professionals towards a focus on the views of the public, including an increasing emphasis on crime 
surveys and victims of crime (Christie, 2000; van Swaaningen, 2013). As has been persuasively 
argued elsewhere (e.g. Garland, 2001b; Pratt et al, 2005), such approaches are often associated 
with a more punitive set of state responses to crime.  
 
Declining prisoner numbers and prison closures: 2005 and beyond 
This second phase was, however, short-lived. Since its highpoint in 2006, there has been a 
remarkable reduction in the Dutch prison population. Between 2006 and 2018, the prison 
population in the Netherlands has halved (49 per cent), and the imprisonment has fallen from 125 
per 100,000 to 61 per 100,000 (Walmsley, 2018). Unsurprisingly, this development has resulted in 
many empty prison spaces, prison closures, and a 22% reduction in custodial staff between 2005 
and 2015 (Aebi et al. 2018a). In 2018, estimating that the prison estate will only require 9,810 spaces 
in 2,023, the Dutch government announced the further closure of 4 prisons, entailing a reduction 
of some 1,500 spaces. The government have also begun renting prison spaces to other European 
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states. Belgium sent prisoners to Tilburg Penitentiary, after 2010 although that agreement came 
to an end in 2016. 55 
According to van Swaaningen (2013), the reduction in the Netherlands prison population was 
largely unexpected, as there had not been any concerted effort by the Dutch government to bring 
down prisoner levels. Although the relationship between crime rates and prison populations is hotly 
contested, Allen (2012: 13) identified a clear correlation between prison rates and changes in the 
seriousness of crimes committed in the Netherlands. Van Swaaningen (2013) identifies a relative 
reduction in the seriousness of the offences being perpetrated as having had the most significant 
impact on declining prisoner numbers. Between 2005-2015, for example, there was a decrease in 
the total number of registered crimes (-28.6%), a corresponding reduction in the number of settled 
court cases by judges    (-22.7%), as well as a reduction in the number of (partial) unconditional 
sentences to imprisonment for adults (-22.5%) (Aebi et al. 2018a). Just as the increase in the crime 
rate was a catalyst for the increase in the rate of imprisonment between 1985 and 2004, there is a 
correlation between the decreasing rate of crime and the decreasing rate of imprisonment since 
2005 (see Figure 2.18).56  
Changing policing practices have also played a crucial role. Van Swaaningen (2013) has highlighted 
the shift towards prevention through policing and community safety (‘zero tolerance policing’) 
which has served to increase the focus on low level anti-social behaviour offences.57 It has also been 
reported that the decrease in the number of people addicted to hard drugs has contributed to the 
fall in crime (van Swaaningen, 2013: 350). 
Treatment programmes and rehabilitation measures have also played a role in reducing prisoner 
levels. For example, offenders with addiction problems can be directed towards the Addict 
Supervision Section (VBA), prisoners displaying aggressive behaviour towards the National 
Isolation Section (LAA), or the special care section for those detained with special needs (Downes 
and van Swaaningen, 2007). Non-custodial sanctions also help to divert offenders from custody 
with the Public Prosecutor able to impose non-custodial penalties (transactions) such as fines and 
community sentence orders (van Swaaningen, 2013).  Fines are the lowest available sanction and 
were originally intended for minor crimes only (Tak, 1999: 62). However, since the Financial 
Penalties Act in 1983, all offences can be sentenced with a fine. The Act also makes clear that fines 
should be preferred to prison sentences (Tak, 1999: 62-63).  
In 2001, the Community Service Order, also known as a Task Penalty (taakstraf), was reformed to 
be a distinct penalty in itself which can be imposed, if thought appropriate, in combination with 
other sanctions (Allen, 2012: 10). This penalty requires a combination of up to 240 hours of work 
and training to be completed within 12 months. It can be applied to all offences, except for sexual 
offences and other serious offences as defined in the Criminal Code or if the offender has been 
                                                                    
55  Recent headlines have declared a ‘Dutch Prison Crisis’ due to the shortage of prisoners. See – BBC News (2016). 
56 Other reforms may also have had some effect on the imprisonment statistics. For example, in 2007, around 27,000 
asylum seekers were given a general pardon which removed them from remand centres (van Swaaningen, 2013: 352). 
57 According to van Swaaningen (2013: 354), despite the low imprisonment rate, Netherlands should not be truly 
considered as non-punitive but “it is rather a case in which welfare provisions have been actively deployed in the fight 
against nuisance and insecurity.” 
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given a community sentence for a similar offence in the previous five years (Netherlands Criminal 
Code, Part II, section 22b-k). There was a significant rise in the use of the Task Penalty throughout 
the last decade, from fewer than 20,000 in 2001 to over 36,000 in 2009 (Allen, 2012: 13). Even if the 
Task Penalty approach has played only relatively minor role in the overall reduction of the 
imprisonment rate, Allen (2012: 13) notes that it has nonetheless proven to be an effective 
replacement for short-term custodial sentences. 
Figure 2.18 
The number of Registered Criminal Cases, Decisions by the Public Prosecution Service, and 
decision by the district courts  
Year Registered Criminal Cases 
Decisions Public 
Prosecution 
Service 
Total Settlement 
by a Judge Convictions 
1994 273,200 161,100 96,500 91,700 
1995 257,800 147,500 102,300 97,200 
1996 250,700 133,800 104,600 99,600 
1997 250,900 130,800 106,400 101,200 
1998 242,500 120,200 105,000 100,200 
1999 234,700 114,500 111,300 105,800 
2000 233,300 118,400 111,000 105,400 
2001 236,000 259,600 113,300 107,100 
2002 251,300 275,400 118,800 112,800 
2003 270,300 292,600 137,400 130,200 
2004 274,000 293,600 136,100 128,800 
2005 266,900 285,800 136,300 127,800 
2006 267,700 287,200 137,800 127,600 
2007 272,700 281,600 131,100 121,000 
2008 263,000 275,900 131,500 120,000 
2009 232,700 268,200 131,000 119,600 
2010 212,900 222,200 113,500 102,400 
2011 232,500 239,400 109,400 97,900 
2012 226,900 240,400 104,200 92,800 
2013 210,600 224,300 104,600 92,800 
2014 212,300 221,800 102,100 89,700 
2015 191,500 203,900 106,400 92,200 
2016 190,900 202,500 94,400 82,500 
Source: CBS (2017) 
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Summary  
The Netherlands provides a fascinating case study due to its significant rise and fall in its 
imprisonment rate over the 20th and early 21st centuries. But it is also a frustrating case study in that 
even whilst it demonstrates that reversing high imprisonment rates is possible, there is no 
consensus as to why this has occurred. And as van Swaaningen warns (2013: 355), the danger is that 
if a decline in imprisonment rates “just happened” there is no obvious reason why it could not, 
equally unexpectedly, reverse itself yet again. Nonetheless there are number of features of the 
penal system in the Netherlands that might well offer inspiration for Wales. They include creation 
of mechanisms to help divert offenders to appropriate services that can both uphold public safety 
and provide an opportunity for rehabilitation, as well as – once again – the availability of robust, 
non-custodial options.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
52 Wales Governance Centre │ International evidence on driving down imprisonment rates 
 
Recommendations and conclusions 
 
 
We noted at the outset of this report some of its limitations. It is a desk-based study and, as such, 
is completely reliant on pre-existing academic work and official data. The case studies are also brief: 
there is clearly very much more that could be said about each of them. We have sought to give an 
overview of each case and draw out some salient points rather than produce a comprehensive 
account. Nonetheless, a number of common themes emerge from which are worth restating: 
themes that also suggest recommendations. In this concluding discussion we draw together these 
common themes and make explicit the recommendations that arise from them. 
 
1. High imprisonment rates are not inevitable 
Wales has the highest imprisonment rate in Western Europe. Yet there is nothing inevitable 
about this situation. As five of our six case studies show, other countries and jurisdictions 
have shown that it is possible to drive down high imprisonment rates. 
Recommendation: 
Welsh politicians, civil society organisations and, indeed, Welsh society as a whole, needs 
to consider whether or not it is content to allow the current situation to persist. In short, we 
need a national conversation about our imprisonment rate. 
 
2. Criminal justice reform is not (necessarily) a left-right issue 
Even if there are some notable exceptions, there can be no doubt that, in general terms, 
prison reform and lowering the imprisonment rate tend to be regarded in the UK as a left-
liberal ‘issue’. As some of our case studies make clear, however, this is not necessarily the 
case. Republican-dominated Texas is one striking counter example. But even more 
germane is the Finnish case, perhaps the most successful European example of a process 
aimed to radically reducing and then maintaining a low imprisonment rate. We noted that 
this effort was motivated by a ‘combination of a rational pragmatist calculation around the 
costs-benefits of incarceration, and a liberal desire for a ‘humane’ criminal justice system’. 
Recommendation: 
Advocates of a national effort to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate should attempt to build 
a cross-party consensus in support of such a move rather than assume that support can only 
be found on one side of the political spectrum. The very substantial (direct and opportunity) 
3 
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costs of having Western Europe’s highest imprisonment rates will be of concern to all who 
are interested in the country’s future. 
 
3. Driving down imprisonment rates is a multi-year, multi-phase process 
Our case studies provide overwhelming evidence that successful attempts to drive down 
imprisonment rates requires a multi-year, multi-phase effort. New York has seen three 
major reforms. It will be recalled that over a forty year period, Finland made no fewer than 
“33 legislative changes…effecting the imprisonment rate, with no fewer than 24 of 
these…purposively introduced to reduce prisoner levels”. Success in this policy area 
requires persistence and determination across multiple different legislative terms. This 
further underlines the desirability of building cross-party and, indeed, cross societal 
consensus. 
Recommendation: 
Advocates of a national effort to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate must recognise that 
theirs would be a ‘long game’. Robust institutionalisation as well as consensus building are 
pre-requisites for success rather that an ‘optional extra’. 
 
4. Driving down imprisonment rates requires a ‘whole system’ approach  
In addition to being multi-year and multi-phase, all our case studies also strongly suggest 
that successful attempts to drive down imprisonment rates require a ‘whole system’ 
approach. This means that all criminal justice agencies including police, prosecutors, courts, 
probation and prison services, need to work to deliver on a national strategy. But also that 
an approach extends beyond justice agencies stricto sensu to embrace other agents of social 
policy as well as other levels of government, in particular local government.  
Given that research presented in our Jagged Edge report has already made clear the 
practical barriers to joined-up working created by the current division between devolved 
and non-devolved responsibilities in and around the area of justice in Wales, recognising the 
imperative of a ‘whole system’ approach if Wales is to move from being a high 
imprisonment society has clear implications for the debate over which if any criminal justice 
powers should be devolved to the Welsh level. Piecemeal or partial transfer of criminal 
justice powers may well be politically more palatable to some, but it needs to be recognised 
that this would almost certainly act as a significant barrier to successful action aimed at 
driving down Wales’ imprisonment rates. 
Recommendation: 
Any future debate about the transfer of criminal justice powers to the National Assembly 
must recognise that any partial transfer will inevitably constrain the ability of devolved level 
politicians and civil servants to develop a ‘whole system’ approach to reducing Wales’ high 
imprisonment rate. 
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5. The operation of welfare and justice systems are intimately interlinked 
The evidence from our case studies is remarkably consistent: failing welfare systems 
substantially increase pressure on criminal justice systems tending to drive up 
imprisonment rates. Conversely, it would appear to be no coincidence that, for example, 
Finland’s move from a high imprisonment to a low imprisonment society coincided with the 
country’s adoption of the classic Scandinavian welfare model. 
Recommendation: 
The Welsh Government has recently indicated its desire to initiate a debate about the future 
of the welfare system in Wales and the Equality, Local Government and Communities 
Committee of the National Assembly is conducting its own enquiry into the subject.58 All 
this contemporaneously with the work and forthcoming recommendations of the 
Commission on Justice in Wales. Given inevitable intertwining of the welfare and criminal 
justice systems, the coincidences of these debates offers an opportunity for policy makers 
to think holistically about how to tackle Wales’ imprisonment rate. 
 
6. Both ‘front end’ and ‘back end’ measures can play a useful role in attempts to reduce 
prisoner numbers.  
Evidence that we have highlighted – from the Californian and New York cases in particular 
– shows the potential usefulness of pre-trial diversion (‘front-end’ measures ) as well as early 
release schemes (‘back-end’ measures) as part of a whole-system strategy aimed at 
reducing prison numbers. 
Recommendation: 
Any attempt to develop a long-term strategy to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate will 
require much more detailed investigation of the approaches successfully adopted 
elsewhere than has been possible in preparing this report. Nonetheless it is clear that there 
exist a very wide range of potential policies that might be considered for emulation or 
adaptation, with actions focused on all stages of the criminal justice process. It is also 
noteworthy that some of these examples derive from jurisdictions that are not normally 
thought to offer a ‘progressive’ alternative. By confining our attentions to the ‘usual 
suspects’ only, there is a danger that we will miss out on useful experiences elsewhere. 
 
7. Alternatives to Imprisonment  
In the introductory chapter we noted that a loss of faith in non-custodial alternatives may 
have played a role in the high use of immediate custody in England and Wales (e.g. HMI 
Probation, 2019). Evidence from our case studies, and from New York, Finland and the 
                                                                    
58 See Ifan and Sion (2019). 
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Netherlands in particular, also underlines the central importance of robust and credible 
alternative to imprisonment to attempts to drive down prison numbers. 
Recommendation: 
Developing robust and credible alternatives to imprisonment is central to any strategy 
aimed at reducing imprisonment rates. And, again, there are numerous examples of 
possible approaches that might be adopted or adapted should the political will and 
constitutional structures align is such a way as to facilitate a concerted attempt to address 
Wales’ imprisonment crisis.  
 
8. Data matters 
In the introduction this report we noted and lamented the fact that so much basic data on 
the operation of the criminal justice system in Wales can only be accessed through freedom 
of information requests. Even within the context of the current division of devolved and 
non-devolved functions in an around criminal justice, the inaccessibility of data is a key 
barrier to understanding, debate and the development of policy. Any concerted effort to 
reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate will place an even higher premium on the availability of 
data. The Portuguese case underlines how vital it is that these data are recognised as 
reliable and robust. 
Recommendation: 
Whatever the future constitutional configuration around the operation of the criminal 
justice system in Wales, it is vital that reliable and robust data on the operation of that 
system is readily available. This is currently not the case. The requirement for data becomes 
even more imperative should there be a concerted attempt to reduce Wales’ imprisonment 
rate. Not least because across what would inevitably be a multi-phase, multi-year, multi-
agency process, honest evaluation of the success or failure of particular initiatives will be 
wholly reliant on the existence of an adequate evidence base. 
 
9. Academic research matters 
Several of our case studies underline the importance of a vibrant academic debate in 
underpinning successful efforts to reduce high imprisonment rates. Two, in particular, stand 
out. In the context of New York’s ‘Alternatives to Incarceration’ programmes, we noted the 
way that ‘research findings are widely shared with practitioners, legal professionals and the 
judiciary in order to ensure that all have access to the best available evidence on desistance 
and offending as well as raising awareness of the options available to judges.’ We also noted 
the key role played by Finland’s Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy in that country’s 
successful efforts to move from one of Western Europe’s highest incarceration rates to one 
of the lowest. 
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Recommendation: 
Given the current lack of academic interest in the workings of the criminal justice system in 
Wales, there is clearly a need to consider how academic research into and engagement with 
the subject can be encouraged, as well as how examples from other jurisdictions can be 
introduced into the Welsh debate. This will become even more important if an effort is to 
made to reform that system and reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate. 
 
10. Popular/populist punitivism drive up imprisonment rates and hinder attempts at reform  
As almost all of our case studies have shown, and as the experiences of the England and 
Wales system also demonstrate, whether it be inspired by so-called ‘populist’ forces or not, 
popular punitivism tends to drive up imprisonment rates and can hinder attempts at reform. 
Should an attempt be made to reduce Wales’ imprisonment rate then there is every reason 
to believe that there will be at least some popular/populist resistance. Our case studies also 
suggest, however, that there are things that can be done to help ameliorate this. In 
particular, adopting the recommendations already made above – on developing a political 
consensus in support of reform; on ensuring the availability of robust alternatives to 
imprisonment; on making available trusted dated; on encouraging the generation and 
discussion of independent academic evidence; and so on – can play an important role in 
supporting transition away from a high imprisonment society. Conversely, failing to do so 
makes it very difficult to imagine any other outcome other than more of the same. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1 
The average prison population rate per 100,000 in Western Europe, 1999 to 2018 
 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
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